artboard-deluxe
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Postinstall runs 'nuxt prepare website', a dev-env codegen step; no malicious behavior. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.5 | 0 / 28 | |
| 0.1.4 | 0 / 28 | |
| 0.1.3 | 0 / 25 | |
| 0.1.2 | 0 / 25 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 25 |
v0.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
2 findingsScript: npm run dev:prepare
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
2 findingsScript: npm run dev:prepare
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.