assistant-stream
Streaming utilities for AI assistants
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Package ships src/; file-count growth is normal build output, no injected payload. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is a placeholder for this long-lived package, not a throwaway. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): SLSA provenance attestation via Sigstore confirms legitimate CI/CD publish, substantially mitigating account-takeover risk from dormancy. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @standard-schema/spec is a well-known, legitimate schema specification package; not a suspicious dependency for this type of library. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): High-download, ecosystem-trusted package; sparse metadata on the 0.0.0 placeholder is benign. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 115)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.27 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.26 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.25 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.24 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.23 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.22 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.21 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.20 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.19 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.18 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.17 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.16 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.15 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.14 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.3.13 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.12 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.11 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.10 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.9 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.8 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.7 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.6 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.5 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.4 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.3 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.2 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.1 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.3.0 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.2.47 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.2.46 | 3 / 3 | |
| 0.2.45 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.2.44 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.2.43 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.2.42 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.2.41 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.2.40 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.2.39 | 3 / 5 | |
| 0.2.37 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.36 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.35 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.34 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.33 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.32 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.31 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.30 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.29 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.28 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.27 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.26 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.25 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.2.24 | 3 / 7 |
v0.3.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.14
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (yonom) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-05-13, but yonom is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.45
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.44
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.43
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.42
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (yonom) on 2025-11-27, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.41
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.40
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.39
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.37
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.36
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.35
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.