aws-appsync-subscription-link
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Fires in test file only; decodes URL search param for assertion — not a payload risk. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Established AWS Amplify package; no material changes from prior version; publisher has strong track record. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.3 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.0.2 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.0.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.0.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 3.1.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.1.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 3.1.3 | 4 / 2 |
v4.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.