axe-core
Accessibility engine for automated Web UI testing
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | url-dep:aria-practices | AI (npm-metadata): devDependency pinned to W3C official repo by SHA; standard for spec test suites not on npm. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | url-dep:wcag-act-rules | AI (npm-metadata): devDependency pinned to W3C official repo by SHA; standard for spec test suites not on npm. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; expected for dequelabs/axe-core. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Package has 1523 versions; gap is between approved versions, not true dormancy. | ai | |
| license | weak-copyleft-license:MPL-2.0 | AI (license): MPL-2.0 is axe-core's longstanding license; stable across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.12.1 | 0 / 64 | |
| 4.12.0 | 0 / 71 | |
| 4.11.4 | 0 / 69 | |
| 4.11.3 | 0 / 69 | |
| 4.11.2 | 0 / 69 | |
| 4.11.1 | 0 / 69 | |
| 4.11.0 | 0 / 70 | |
| 4.10.3 | 0 / 70 | |
| 4.10.2 | 0 / 69 | |
| 4.10.1 | 0 / 69 | |
| 4.10.0 | 0 / 69 | |
| 4.9.1 | 0 / 67 |
v4.12.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.12.0
3 findingsDependency 'aria-practices' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:w3c/aria-practices#ce0336bd82d7d3651abcbde86af644197ddbc629' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Dependency 'wcag-act-rules' in `devDependencies` points to 'github:w3c/wcag-act-rules#5adb55d19eb2cd7fb23213b2d1acedf9004dc063' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.11.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.11.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.10.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.10.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.9.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.