azion
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/config/dist/types-gdGgmyzW.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long single-line type declaration file, not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/config/dist/types-gdGgmyzW.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Long single-line type declaration file, not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/config/dist/types-Dgc9kGOc.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Long single-line .d.ts type declarations, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/config/dist/types-Dgc9kGOc.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long single-line .d.ts type declarations, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:packages/wasm-image-processor/dist/index.cjs | AI (source-diff): bundled WASM processor calling package's own build/runtime, dual-use fetch+exec pattern expected | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:packages/presets/dist/index.mjs | AI (source-diff): Next.js/edge preset handler bundle, fetch targets are framework-internal, no exfil destination | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/config/dist/index.cjs | AI (source-diff): esbuild bundle output, normal config schema constants, not obfuscation | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:packages/wasm-image-processor/dist/index.mjs | AI (source-diff): Same base64 decode polyfill, mjs build output. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:packages/wasm-image-processor/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Base64 decode polyfill for wasm bindings, not a hidden payload. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/presets/dist/routing-RKO7PJAL.cjs | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/config/dist/types-DzmEOhU3.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Long single-line generated .d.ts type file, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/config/dist/types-DzmEOhU3.d.mts | AI (source-diff): Long single-line generated .d.ts type file, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/presets/dist/routing-IXNMJLMX.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/presets/dist/routing-IHJ5U3VD.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/presets/dist/routing-JADJBEDM.cjs | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output (tsup/webpack chunk), not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/wasm-image-processor/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled wasm wrapper output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/applications/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): tsup/esbuild bundled output, not true obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/client/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled dist output with standard tsup helpers. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:packages/client/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): fetch() calls target Azion's own API, not a dropper. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/config/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/cookies/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/domains/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled output calling own azionapi.net endpoints. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/jwt/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled JWT helper lib output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/presets/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled preset output. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:packages/presets/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Framework preset code, no unrelated exfil destination. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/purge/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/sql/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/storage/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:packages/wasm-image-processor/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Image processing module, no unrelated destination. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:packages/bundler/dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): esbuild-bundled bundler package output. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Registry import gap, not npm publish gap; package publishes continuously on npm. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:axios | AI (typosquat): azion is an established CDN platform SDK with 992 days history and 239 versions; not a typosquat of axios. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process used in build-time Vercel integration utility; expected for a bundler/preset tool. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Base64 decoding used to read bundled asset content in Next.js preset; not a malicious payload pattern. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require used to load user config files in bundler context; expected pattern for this tool. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/preset-env | AI (phantom-deps): Babel preset loaded by convention in bundler; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/preset-typescript | AI (phantom-deps): Babel preset loaded by convention in bundler; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/plugin-proposal-optional-chaining-assign | AI (phantom-deps): Babel plugin loaded by convention in bundler; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:babel-loader | AI (phantom-deps): Babel toolchain dep referenced in bundler config; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:progress | AI (phantom-deps): CLI utility dep referenced in config; stable false positive for this bundler package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:inherits | AI (phantom-deps): Browserify polyfill referenced in bundler config; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:timers-browserify | AI (phantom-deps): Browserify polyfill referenced in bundler config; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:string_decoder | AI (phantom-deps): Browserify polyfill referenced in bundler config; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:vm-browserify | AI (phantom-deps): Browserify polyfill referenced in bundler config; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:stream-http | AI (phantom-deps): Browserify polyfill referenced in bundler config; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:assert-browserify | AI (phantom-deps): Browserify polyfill referenced in bundler config; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:events | AI (phantom-deps): Browserify polyfill referenced in bundler config; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:chalk | AI (phantom-deps): CLI utility dep referenced in config files; stable false positive for this bundler package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:util | AI (phantom-deps): Node built-in polyfill referenced in bundler config; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:mime | AI (phantom-deps): Browserify polyfill deps referenced in bundler config files; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 23 of 23)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.5 | 35 / 21 | |
| 3.1.4 | 35 / 21 | |
| 3.1.3 | 36 / 21 | |
| 3.1.2 | 36 / 21 | |
| 3.1.1 | 36 / 21 | |
| 3.1.0 | 36 / 21 | |
| 3.0.0 | 36 / 20 | |
| 2.3.3 | 36 / 20 | |
| 2.3.2 | 36 / 20 | |
| 2.3.1 | 36 / 20 | |
| 2.3.0 | 36 / 21 | |
| 1.20.24 | 36 / 20 | |
| 1.20.23 | 35 / 20 | |
| 1.20.22 | 35 / 20 | |
| 1.20.21 | 36 / 20 | |
| 1.20.20 | 36 / 20 | |
| 1.20.19 | 36 / 20 | |
| 1.20.18 | 36 / 20 | |
| 1.20.17 | 36 / 20 | |
| 1.20.15 | 36 / 21 | |
| 1.20.14 | 36 / 21 | |
| 1.20.13 | 36 / 21 | |
| 1.20.12 | 36 / 21 |
v3.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.2
14 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (esbuild) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.1
14 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (esbuild) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
14 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (esbuild) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
7 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.3
7 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.2
7 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.1
7 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.20.24
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.22
16 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator. Artifact: bundled (esbuild) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.21
3 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.20.17
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (jotanarciso) on 2025-12-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.20.15
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (jcbsfilho) than the most recent previously approved version (jotanarciso) on 2025-12-11, but jcbsfilho is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.20.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.20.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.20.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.