backfill-hasher
Backfill Hasher
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:fs-extra | AI (phantom-deps): fs-extra is a declared runtime dependency; phantom-dep heuristic misfires on this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:backfill-config | AI (phantom-deps): backfill-config is a declared runtime dependency; phantom-dep heuristic misfires on this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Microsoft/lage repo publishes via GitHub Actions with SLSA attestation; CI publisher transition is expected and verified. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): The dynamic require loads a package.json from a known filesystem path — standard pattern for a build-cache hasher. No arbitrary code execution risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.7.8 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.7.7 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.7.6 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.7.5 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.7.4 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.7.3 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.7.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.7.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 6.7.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 6.6.3 | 5 / 7 | |
| 6.6.2 | 5 / 7 | |
| 6.6.1 | 5 / 7 |
v6.7.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.7.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.7.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.7.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.7.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.7.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.7.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.