bree
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Long-established package; provenance absence is consistent across all prior versions and not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:safe-timers | AI (dependencies): Legitimate timer utility dependency; stable for this package across versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:human-interval | AI (dependencies): Legitimate human-readable interval parser; stable for this package across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.2.9 | 8 / 24 | |
| 9.2.8 | 8 / 24 | |
| 9.2.6 | 8 / 23 | |
| 9.2.5 | 10 / 23 | |
| 6.5.0 | 13 / 31 |
v9.2.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.2.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v9.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.