browser-use-sdk
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Process regression, no behavioral evidence of tampering; diff shows no material changes. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): Version diff vs last approved shows no material change; likely baseline artifact. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:dotenv | AI (phantom-deps): dotenv used via config/env loading, not a real risk. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Change reflects CI/CD provenance adoption (GitHub Actions publisher), confirmed IMPROVED direction. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): SDK published without CI provenance consistently; not a malware signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.10.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 3.9.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.8.4 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.8.1 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.8.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.6.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.5.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.4.3 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.4.2 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.4.1 | 2 / 6 | |
| 3.0.3 | 2 / 6 | |
| 2.0.15 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.0.13 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.0.12 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.0.11 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.0.10 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.0.9 | 2 / 12 | |
| 2.0.8 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.0.7 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.0.6 | 1 / 13 | |
| 2.0.5 | 1 / 13 |
v3.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.8.4
2 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (provenance): New publisher larsen-bowser-use has zero track record; consistent account-compromise signal across all versions published by this account.) This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.