buddy-bot
Automated & optimized dependency updates for JavaScript & TypeScript projects. Like Renovate & Dependabot.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:ts-pantry | AI (phantom-deps): Declared dep used via config, not direct import; benign. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/chunk-7qp66n84.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled playwright-core vendor code (Bun banner), not a loader/dropper. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Explained by bundling new ts-pkgx dependency and its transitive deps. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/prompts | AI (phantom-deps): Types package used by convention. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:ts-pkgx | AI (dependencies): Same-author ecosystem dep, no fetch/exec behavior; normal supply-chain addition. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bunfig | AI (phantom-deps): Used via config, not direct import; heuristic false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.9.25 | 2 / 14 | |
| 0.9.23 | 2 / 14 | |
| 0.9.22 | 2 / 14 | |
| 0.9.21 | 2 / 14 | |
| 0.9.20 | 2 / 14 | |
| 0.9.19 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.9.18 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.9.17 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.9.16 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.9.15 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.9.14 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.9.13 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.9.12 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.4.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.4.0 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.3.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.2.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.2.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.0.3 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.0.2 | 4 / 5 |
v0.9.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.23
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.18
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-03-26, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.9.17
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-03-04, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.9.16
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-02-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.9.15
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-02-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.9.14
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-02-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.9.13
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chrisbreuer) on 2026-02-10, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.9.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (bun) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (bun) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (bun) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (bun) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware. Artifact: bundled (bun) — bundler banner in the scanned head, but the file is larger than the scan window and its remainder is unclassified, so this is not a clean bill of health.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.