bun-pty
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions because the maintainer automated publishing via CI/CD with SLSA provenance attestation — this is a legitimate and security-improving transition, not a compromise. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): bun-pty is a Rust-based native PTY binding; bundled .so/.dylib/.dll files are the core FFI component, consistent with the package's stated purpose and Rust build pipeline. SLSA provenance attestation further validates binary integrity. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.8 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.4.7 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.4.6 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.4.5 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.4.4 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.4.3 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.4.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.4.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.3.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.3.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.2.9 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.2.8 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.2.6 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.2.5 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.2.4 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 1 |
v0.4.8
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • rust-pty/target/release/rust_pty.dll • rust-pty/target/release/librust_pty_arm64.dylib • rust-pty/target/release/librust_pty.dylib • rust-pty/target/release/librust_pty_arm64.so • rust-pty/target/release/librust_pty.so
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.