bun-query-builder
A simple yet performant query builder for TypeScript. Built with Bun.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stacksjs/launchpad | AI (phantom-deps): Declared in dependencies but only referenced in config files; phantom-dep heuristic is accurate here. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; consistent with stacksjs org automation pattern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established stacksjs publisher; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@stacksjs/clapp | AI (phantom-deps): Config-file reference only; not a real import risk for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:dynamodb-tooling | AI (phantom-deps): Config-file reference only; not a real import risk for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.37 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.36 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.35 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.34 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.33 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.32 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.31 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.30 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.29 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.28 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.27 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.26 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.25 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.24 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.23 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.21 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.20 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.18 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.17 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.13 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.12 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.11 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.1.10 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.1.9 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.1.5 | 2 / 1 |
v0.1.37
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.36
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.34
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.31
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.30
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.29
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.24
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.23
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.