classix
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; stable pattern for this package going forward. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by CI/CD automation setup is a known legitimate pattern; SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.2.12 | 0 / 26 | |
| 2.2.11 | 0 / 26 | |
| 2.2.10 | 0 / 26 | |
| 2.2.9 | 0 / 26 | |
| 2.2.8 | 0 / 26 | |
| 2.2.7 | 0 / 25 | |
| 2.2.6 | 0 / 24 | |
| 2.2.5 | 0 / 24 | |
| 2.2.4 | 0 / 24 | |
| 2.2.3 | 0 / 24 | |
| 2.2.0 | 0 / 24 |
v2.2.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.