cmake-fetch
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): Transfer from kasperisager to mafintosh is a known internal Holepunch org handoff; repo URL confirms holepunchto ownership. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; consistent with org-level automation adoption. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by a CI-published release with SLSA provenance; low-risk CMake utility package. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.5.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.5.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.5.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.7 | 0 / 0 |
v1.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.0
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (kasperisager) were replaced by new maintainers (mafintosh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.10
3 findingsAll previous maintainers (kasperisager) were replaced by new maintainers (mafintosh). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.