codex-notifier
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:ifmo.su | AI (email-domain): Long-standing CodeX Team author email; latent domain risk, not a behavior in this version. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | url-dep:eslint-config-codex | AI (npm-metadata): Dev-only github dep on the team's own eslint config; stable across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.2 | 0 / 17 | |
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 17 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 17 | |
| 1.0.6 | 0 / 17 |
v1.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'ifmo.su' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'ifmo.su' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.6
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'ifmo.su' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.