customerio-node
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package now publishes via GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation; this is the expected pattern for org-managed packages. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer change aligns with org-level transition to CI-based publishing; no malicious indicators. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of prior maintainers consistent with org restructuring; no code changes or suspicious artifacts. | ai | |
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:enlist.io | AI (email-domain): Package is the official Customer.io Node SDK with 10yr history; enlist.io may be defunct but org ownership is clear via GitHub. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.5.1 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.5.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.4.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.3.0 | 0 / 10 | |
| 4.2.0 | 0 / 10 |
v4.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'enlist.io' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.