devframe
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:launch-editor | AI (dependencies): launch-editor is a widely-used, legitimate package (used by Vue CLI, Vite, etc.); stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/devtool-Bm6zZAw5.d.mts | AI (source-diff): File is a bundled TypeScript declaration (.d.mts); long lines are from concatenated type definitions, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): antfu routinely publishes placeholder/scaffolding packages at 0.0.0; not a malware signal for this publisher. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Placeholder package from a well-established, trusted publisher; sparse metadata is expected for scaffolding stubs. | ai |
Versions (showing 24 of 24)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.7.0 | 10 / 17 | |
| 0.6.2 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.6.1 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.6.0 | 11 / 16 | |
| 0.5.4 | 9 / 15 | |
| 0.5.3 | 9 / 15 | |
| 0.5.2 | 9 / 15 | |
| 0.5.1 | 9 / 15 | |
| 0.5.0 | 9 / 15 | |
| 0.4.1 | 9 / 15 | |
| 0.4.0 | 9 / 14 | |
| 0.3.0 | 9 / 14 | |
| 0.2.3 | 9 / 14 | |
| 0.2.2 | 9 / 14 | |
| 0.2.1 | 9 / 16 | |
| 0.2.0 | 9 / 16 | |
| 0.1.22 | 9 / 9 | |
| 0.1.21 | 14 / 4 | |
| 0.1.20 | 14 / 4 | |
| 0.1.19 | 12 / 5 | |
| 0.1.18 | 12 / 5 | |
| 0.1.17 | 12 / 5 | |
| 0.1.16 | 12 / 5 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.20
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.