didwebvh-ts
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher is GitHub Actions CI for the same decentralized-identity org; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate automated publish. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): cookie, glob, js-yaml are established packages with no known malicious history; phantom-dep findings suggest limited direct use. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:js-yaml | AI (phantom-deps): Used in bundled output; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:glob | AI (phantom-deps): Used in build scripts/bundled output; phantom-dep heuristic fires on compiled packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:json-canonicalize | AI (phantom-deps): Used in bundled output; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@noble/hashes | AI (phantom-deps): Cryptographic dep used in bundled output; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:cookie | AI (phantom-deps): Used in bundled output; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 20 of 20)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.7.5 | 5 / 7 | |
| 2.7.4 | 5 / 10 | |
| 2.7.3 | 5 / 10 | |
| 2.7.2 | 5 / 10 | |
| 2.7.1 | 5 / 10 | |
| 2.5.6 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.5.5 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.5.4 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.5.3 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.5.2 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.5.1 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.5.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.4.1 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.4.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.3.2 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.3.1 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.3.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.2.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.1.0 | 2 / 9 | |
| 2.0.2 | 1 / 9 |
v2.7.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.7.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.5.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.5.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.