dumi
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): First-party swc wasm plugin built by build:crates; stable for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Expected transition to CI/CD-attested publishing (GitHub Actions), improvement not compromise. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Byproduct of CI publish environment change, offset by new SLSA attestation. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:dumi-afx-deps | AI (dependencies): First-party dumi-* companion package, consistent with monorepo deps. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/hast | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only package loaded by framework convention. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/mdast | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only package loaded by framework convention. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:eval-usage | AI (semgrep): eval in compiled/loader-runner is the standard webpack loader-runner ESM dynamic import pattern, not malicious. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:react-simple-code-editor | AI (phantom-deps): Loaded by convention in dumi's live editor feature. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require in loader-runner is standard webpack loader loading pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:heti | AI (phantom-deps): heti is a declared runtime dep used as optional peer/plugin, referenced in config files by convention. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:sass | AI (phantom-deps): sass is a declared dep used as optional CSS preprocessor, loaded by convention in umi/dumi builds. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:prismjs | AI (phantom-deps): prismjs loaded by convention in dumi's syntax highlighting pipeline. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:rc-motion | AI (phantom-deps): rc-motion is a UI dep loaded by convention in the theme layer. | ai |
Versions (showing 53 of 53)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.4.48 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.47 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.46 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.45 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.44 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.43 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.42 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.41 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.40 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.39 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.38 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.37 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.36 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.35 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.34 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.33 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.32 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.31 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.30 | 68 / 34 | |
| 2.4.29 | 68 / 34 | |
| 2.4.28 | 68 / 34 | |
| 2.4.27 | 68 / 34 | |
| 2.4.26 | 68 / 34 | |
| 2.4.25 | 68 / 34 | |
| 2.4.23 | 68 / 34 | |
| 2.4.22 | 68 / 34 | |
| 2.4.21 | 68 / 34 | |
| 2.4.20 | 68 / 34 | |
| 2.4.18 | 68 / 34 | |
| 2.4.17 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.16 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.15 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.14 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.13 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.12 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.11 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.10 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.9 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.8 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.7 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.6 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.5 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.4 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.3 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.2 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.1 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.4.0 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.3.8 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.3.7 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.3.6 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.3.5 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.3.4 | 68 / 35 | |
| 2.3.3 | 68 / 35 |
v2.4.48
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.47
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.46
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.45
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.44
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.43
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.42
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.41
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.40
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.4.39
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
v2.4.38
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
v2.4.37
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
v2.4.36
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
v2.4.35
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
v2.4.33
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
v2.4.32
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
v2.4.31
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
v2.4.30
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
v2.4.29
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
v2.4.28
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
v2.4.25
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zoomdong07.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.4.20
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.18
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.17
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.16
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.15
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.14
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.13
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.12
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.11
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.10
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.9
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.8
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.8
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.7
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.6
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiled/crates/swc_plugin_react_demo.wasm
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.