electron-publish
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from personal account to GitHub Actions is expected for CI/CD automation; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate build origin. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Intentional pattern: passes process.env plus credential overrides to snapcraft subprocess; stable across versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/fs-extra | AI (phantom-deps): @types/fs-extra is a type declaration used at compile time; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): electron-publish is a well-known electron-builder sub-package; sparse README/keywords are a stable characteristic, not spam. | ai |
Versions (showing 23 of 23)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 26.15.3 | 9 / 2 | |
| 26.15.1 | 9 / 2 | |
| 26.15.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 26.14.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 26.13.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 26.12.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.12.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.11.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.11.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.10.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.9.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.8.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.8.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.6.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.4.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.3.4 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.3.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.3.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.1.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.0.20 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.0.19 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.0.17 | 8 / 1 | |
| 26.0.16 | 8 / 1 |
v26.15.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.15.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.15.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.14.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.13.0
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 38 | return (0, builder_util_1.spawn)("snapcraft", args, { 39 | stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"], > 40 | env: { ...process.env, ...credEnv }, 41 | }); 42 | }
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.12.1
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 38 | return (0, builder_util_1.spawn)("snapcraft", args, { 39 | stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"], > 40 | env: { ...process.env, ...credEnv }, 41 | }); 42 | }
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.12.0
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 38 | return (0, builder_util_1.spawn)("snapcraft", args, { 39 | stdio: ["ignore", "inherit", "inherit"], > 40 | env: { ...process.env, ...credEnv }, 41 | }); 42 | }
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.11.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.3.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v26.0.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v26.0.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v26.0.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v26.0.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.