electron-winstaller
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| install-scripts | install-script:install | AI (install-scripts): Selects correct 7z arch binary; expected for this Windows installer package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Squirrel, WiX, 7z are the core vendor toolchain this package wraps. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): Spawns installer-building tools; inherent to package purpose. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.4.0 | 5 / 12 |
v5.4.0
3 findingsScript: node ./script/select-7z-arch.js
Package contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/Squirrel.com • vendor/7z-arm64.dll • vendor/7z-x64.dll • vendor/Microsoft.Deployment.Resources.dll • vendor/Microsoft.Deployment.WindowsInstaller.dll • vendor/wconsole.dll • vendor/winterop.dll • vendor/wix.dll • vendor/WixNetFxExtension.dll • vendor/7z-arm64.exe ... and 12 more
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.