eslint-plugin-vitest-globals
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:https://github.com/saqqdy | AI (email-domain): Email field contains a GitHub profile URL, not a real email domain; no actual domain hijack risk. | ai |
v1.6.1
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/saqqdy' uses domain 'https://github.com/saqqdy' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.0
2 findingsMaintainer email 'https://github.com/saqqdy' uses domain 'https://github.com/saqqdy' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.