ethr-did-resolver
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): Raw IP is 127.0.0.1 in a JSDoc example comment for local dev; not a live network request. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 13.0.0 | 2 / 14 | |
| 12.0.1 | 2 / 14 | |
| 12.0.0 | 2 / 14 | |
| 11.1.3 | 2 / 14 | |
| 11.1.2 | 2 / 17 | |
| 11.1.1 | 2 / 17 | |
| 11.1.0 | 2 / 16 |
v13.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v12.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v12.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.