expo-image-picker
Provides access to the system's UI for selecting images and videos from the phone's library or taking a photo with the camera.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Expo canary builds are published from a different CI environment that does not inject gitHead; this is consistent across canary releases from this publisher and not a meaningful risk signal. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:expo-permissions | AI (dependencies): expo-permissions is a sibling official Expo SDK package from the same expo/expo monorepo; its use here is expected and legitimate for permission handling in the image picker. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | suspicious-version-number | AI (publish-pattern): Expo uses date-stamped canary version strings (e.g., X.Y.Z-canary-YYYYMMDD-HASH) as a standard convention across all their packages. This pattern is not malicious. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:expo-permissions | AI (phantom-deps): expo-permissions is referenced in Expo config/plugin files rather than direct JS imports; this is a standard pattern for Expo native modules and not a security concern. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Expo SDK package from a known publisher; lack of provenance attestation is common and not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer changes within the Expo organization are routine; no evidence of hostile takeover given the official repo URL and publisher track record. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): brentvatne is a core Expo maintainer with a strong track record (91 approved packages); publisher rotation within the Expo org is expected and not a risk signal for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:expo-image-loader | AI (phantom-deps): expo-image-loader is a native module dependency referenced in config/plugin files rather than JS imports — expected pattern for Expo SDK packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:expo-image-loader | AI (dependencies): expo-image-loader is a first-party Expo monorepo package (github.com/expo/expo); unvetted status is a pipeline artifact, not a real risk. Stable for all versions of this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 133)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 56.0.17 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.16 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.15 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.14 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.13 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.12 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.11 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.10 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.9 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.8 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.7 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.6 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.5 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.4 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.3 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 56.0.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 55.0.20 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.19 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.18 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.17 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.16 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.15 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.14 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.13 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.12 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.11 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.10 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.9 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.8 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.7 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.6 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 55.0.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 17.0.11 | 1 / 2 | |
| 17.0.10 | 1 / 2 | |
| 17.0.9 | 1 / 2 | |
| 17.0.8 | 1 / 2 | |
| 17.0.7 | 1 / 2 | |
| 17.0.6 | 1 / 2 | |
| 17.0.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 17.0.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 17.0.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 17.0.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 17.0.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 17.0.0 | 1 / 2 |
v56.0.17
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (alanhughes) than the most recent previously approved version (brentvatne) on 2026-06-10, but alanhughes is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v56.0.16
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (brentvatne) than the most recent previously approved version (alanhughes) on 2026-06-05, but brentvatne is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v56.0.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.13
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (alanhughes) than the most recent previously approved version (brentvatne) on 2026-05-23, but alanhughes is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v56.0.12
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v56.0.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.9
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v56.0.8
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v56.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v56.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v55.0.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.