falkordb
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance attestation — this is an intentional, verifiable automation transition, not a suspicious account takeover. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @js-temporal/polyfill is a legitimate, well-known TC39 Temporal polyfill. Its addition is appropriate for a database client handling temporal data types. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:generic-pool | AI (phantom-deps): generic-pool is a known transitive dep of redis/@redis/client; pinning it directly is a common pattern in Redis client libraries, not a security concern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:cluster-key-slot | AI (phantom-deps): cluster-key-slot is a known transitive dep of redis/@redis/client; pinning it directly is a common pattern in Redis client libraries, not a security concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.6.2 | 6 / 12 | |
| 6.6.1 | 6 / 12 | |
| 6.6.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 6.5.1 | 6 / 12 | |
| 6.5.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 6.4.1 | 6 / 12 | |
| 6.4.0 | 6 / 12 | |
| 6.3.1 | 5 / 12 | |
| 6.3.0 | 5 / 12 |
v6.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.