fastmcp
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Change is to GitHub Actions CI publish with SLSA attestation; benign for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zod-to-json-schema | AI (phantom-deps): Directly declared and used in build; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:xsschema | AI (dependencies): xsschema is a schema validation library contextually appropriate for an MCP framework; no malicious indicators. Package has SLSA provenance and 488-day history. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:mcp-proxy | AI (dependencies): mcp-proxy is directly related to the MCP ecosystem this package serves; contextually expected dependency. Package has SLSA provenance and 488-day history. | ai |
Versions (showing 50 of 50)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.12.1 | 14 / 27 | |
| 4.12.0 | 14 / 27 | |
| 4.11.0 | 14 / 27 | |
| 4.10.0 | 14 / 27 | |
| 4.9.2 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.9.1 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.9.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.8.1 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.8.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.7.2 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.7.1 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.7.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.6.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.5.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.4.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.3.2 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.3.1 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.3.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.2.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.1.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.0.2 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.0.1 | 14 / 25 | |
| 4.0.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 3.35.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 3.34.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 3.33.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 3.32.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 3.31.0 | 14 / 25 | |
| 3.30.1 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.30.0 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.29.0 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.28.0 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.27.0 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.26.10 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.26.9 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.26.8 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.26.7 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.26.6 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.26.5 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.26.4 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.26.3 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.26.2 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.25.4 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.25.3 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.25.2 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.25.1 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.25.0 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.24.0 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.23.1 | 13 / 25 | |
| 3.23.0 | 13 / 25 |
v4.12.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.12.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.9.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.9.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.34.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.33.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.32.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.31.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.30.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.30.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.29.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.28.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.27.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.26.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.26.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.26.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.26.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.26.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.26.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.26.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.26.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.26.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.25.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.25.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.25.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.25.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.25.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.24.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.23.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.