fuse-shared-library-linux
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Package is a native FUSE binding; libfuse.so, fusermount, and .node binaries are expected shipped artifacts. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): child_process used to invoke fusermount/mount.fuse — standard pattern for FUSE library wrappers. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 1 |
v1.0.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • example/build/Release/fuse_example.node • example/build/Release/libfuse.so • example/build/Release/obj.target/fuse_example.node • example/build/Release/obj.target/fuse_example/binding.o • libfuse/bin/fusermount • libfuse/bin/mount.fuse • libfuse/lib/libfuse.so • libfuse/lib/libfuse3.so
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.