hono
Web framework built on Web Standards
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from maintainer to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA attestation; expected for this project. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pino | AI (typosquat): Hono is a major web framework with 34.7M weekly downloads and 1591 days of history. The Levenshtein similarity to 'pino' is purely coincidental; no impersonation intent. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Hono is a well-established package with strong ecosystem trust signals. Lack of Sigstore provenance is not a meaningful risk indicator here. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.12.26 | 0 / 25 | |
| 4.12.25 | 0 / 27 | |
| 4.12.24 | 0 / 27 | |
| 4.12.23 | 0 / 28 | |
| 4.12.22 | 0 / 28 | |
| 4.12.21 | 0 / 28 | |
| 4.12.20 | 0 / 28 | |
| 4.12.19 | 0 / 28 | |
| 4.12.18 | 0 / 28 | |
| 4.12.17 | 0 / 28 | |
| 4.12.16 | 0 / 28 | |
| 4.12.15 | 0 / 28 | |
| 4.12.14 | 0 / 28 |
v4.12.26
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.12.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.12.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.12.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.12.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.12.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.12.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.12.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.12.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.12.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.12.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.12.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.