hypercore
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; consistent with holepunchto org's CI/CD practices. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation present; strongest supply chain integrity signal. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): lejeunerenard is a known contributor in the holepunchto ecosystem; addition is consistent with legitimate team growth for this active project. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Hypercore is a long-established package from its original maintainer mafintosh; dormancy followed by resumed development is consistent with the holepunchto ecosystem's release cadence. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:hypercore-storage | AI (dependencies): hypercore-storage is a first-party storage backend for hypercore, maintained by the same Holepunch organization. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:b4a | AI (dependencies): b4a is a well-known Buffer/Uint8Array compatibility library from the Holepunch ecosystem, stable and widely used across many P2P packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:streamx | AI (dependencies): streamx is a well-established streams implementation from the Holepunch/mafintosh ecosystem, used across many legitimate packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): hypercore is a long-established Holepunch ecosystem package; lack of provenance is consistent across all versions and is not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:bare-events | AI (phantom-deps): bare-events is intentionally declared in package.json imports for Bare runtime compatibility — a documented Holepunch ecosystem pattern, not a phantom dependency in the traditional sense. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 81)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.33.1 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.33.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.32.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.31.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.30.2 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.30.1 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.29.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.28.1 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.28.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.17 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.16 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.15 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.14 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.13 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.12 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.11 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.10 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.9 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.8 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.7 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.6 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.5 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.4 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.3 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.2 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.1 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.27.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.26.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.25.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.24.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.23.1 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.23.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.22.2 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.22.1 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.22.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.21.7 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.21.6 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.21.5 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.21.4 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.21.2 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.21.1 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.21.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.20.2 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.20.1 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.20.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.19.1 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.19.0 | 21 / 14 | |
| 11.18.4 | 21 / 13 | |
| 11.18.3 | 21 / 13 | |
| 11.18.2 | 21 / 13 | |
| 11.18.1 | 21 / 13 |
v11.33.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.33.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.32.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.31.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.30.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.30.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v11.29.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v11.28.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.28.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (lejeunerenard) than the most recent previously approved version (mafintosh) on 2026-03-27, but lejeunerenard is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v11.27.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.27.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.27.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.27.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.27.13
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v11.27.12
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v11.27.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.27.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.27.9
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v11.27.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.27.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.27.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.27.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.27.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.27.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.27.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v11.27.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.27.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.26.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v11.25.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.24.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.23.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.23.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.22.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.22.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.22.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.21.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.21.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.21.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.21.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.21.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.21.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.21.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.20.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.20.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.20.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.19.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.19.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.18.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.18.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v11.18.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v11.18.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.