injectkit
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is consistent with CI/CD automation; SLSA attestation confirms supply chain integrity. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/browser/injectkit.js | AI (source-diff): Browser bundle generated by tsup; sample shows standard bundler boilerplate with reflect-metadata, not malicious code. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/browser/injectkit.min.js | AI (source-diff): Minified browser bundle from tsup; same reflect-metadata content as unminified counterpart, no exfiltration. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase explained by bundling reflect-metadata into the new browser distribution target. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.2 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.4.1 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.4.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.3.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.2.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.1.3 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.1.2 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.1.1 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 13 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 13 |
v1.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
3 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.