intl-tel-input
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:vue/build/intl-tel-input/data.d.ts | AI (source-diff): This is a TypeScript declaration file containing inline country dial code data as a large tuple. Long lines are expected for this dataset and are not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): New source files are Vue framework build outputs, consistent with the new ./vue and ./vueWithUtils exports added in this version. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions as part of a legitimate CI/CD migration; confirmed by SLSA Sigstore attestation. This is the expected pattern for automated publishing from the official jackocnr/intl-tel-input repo. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 83)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 29.0.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 29.0.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 29.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 29.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 29.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 29.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 28.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 28.0.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 28.0.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 28.0.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 28.0.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 28.0.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 28.0.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 28.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 28.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 28.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 28.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 27.3.1 | 0 / 54 | |
| 27.3.0 | 0 / 54 | |
| 27.2.1 | 0 / 56 | |
| 27.2.0 | 0 / 54 | |
| 27.1.3 | 0 / 54 | |
| 27.1.2 | 0 / 54 | |
| 27.1.1 | 0 / 54 | |
| 27.1.0 | 0 / 54 | |
| 27.0.17 | 0 / 54 | |
| 27.0.16 | 0 / 54 | |
| 27.0.15 | 0 / 54 | |
| 27.0.11 | 0 / 54 | |
| 27.0.10 | 0 / 54 | |
| 27.0.9 | 0 / 49 | |
| 27.0.8 | 0 / 47 | |
| 27.0.7 | 0 / 47 | |
| 27.0.6 | 0 / 47 | |
| 27.0.5 | 0 / 47 | |
| 27.0.4 | 0 / 47 | |
| 27.0.3 | 0 / 47 | |
| 27.0.2 | 0 / 47 | |
| 27.0.1 | 0 / 47 | |
| 27.0.0 | 0 / 47 | |
| 26.9.2 | 0 / 62 | |
| 26.9.1 | 0 / 62 | |
| 26.9.0 | 0 / 62 | |
| 26.8.1 | 0 / 62 | |
| 26.8.0 | 0 / 62 | |
| 26.7.6 | 0 / 62 | |
| 26.7.5 | 0 / 62 | |
| 26.7.4 | 0 / 62 | |
| 26.7.3 | 0 / 62 | |
| 26.7.2 | 0 / 62 | |
| 26.7.1 | 0 / 62 |
v29.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v29.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v29.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v29.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v29.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v29.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.0.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.0.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.0.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v27.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v27.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v27.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v27.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v27.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v27.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v27.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v27.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v27.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v27.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v27.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v26.9.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v26.9.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v26.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.