ipull
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance attestation confirming builds come from the legitimate ido-pluto/ipull repo. This is a stable automated release setup. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy followed by automated CI/CD release with SLSA attestation; consistent with project revival using new release tooling, not account takeover. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash.debounce | AI (phantom-deps): lodash.debounce is listed in runtime dependencies and @types/lodash.debounce in devDeps; phantom detection is a false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package with 64 versions and clear GitHub repo; lack of Sigstore provenance is not a security concern here. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.3 | 20 / 28 | |
| 4.0.2 | 20 / 28 | |
| 4.0.1 | 20 / 28 | |
| 4.0.0 | 20 / 28 | |
| 3.9.5 | 19 / 27 | |
| 3.9.4 | 19 / 27 |
v4.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.9.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.