jsencrypt
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:eval-usage | AI (semgrep): All eval() usages are Webpack development-mode bundle artifacts (__webpack_require__ pattern), not arbitrary code execution. This is a stable false positive for this Webpack-bundled package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): jsencrypt is a 4245-day-old established package; lack of Sigstore provenance is expected for packages predating the feature and is not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.5.4 | 0 / 18 | |
| 3.5.3 | 0 / 18 | |
| 3.5.2 | 0 / 18 | |
| 3.5.1 | 0 / 18 | |
| 3.5.0 | 0 / 18 | |
| 3.4.0 | 0 / 18 |
v3.5.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.