jsii-rosetta
[](https://cdk.dev) [](https://github.com/aws/jsii-
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): aws-cdk-team publishes jsii-rosetta continuously (2504 versions); dormancy signal is a data artifact for this high-volume, trusted AWS package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:jsii | AI (dependencies): jsii is a first-party AWS CDK toolchain package and a core dependency of jsii-rosetta; stable and expected across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@jsii/spec | AI (dependencies): @jsii/spec is a first-party AWS CDK ecosystem package; a stable, expected dependency for jsii-rosetta across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:semver-intersect | AI (dependencies): semver-intersect is a small, stable semver utility with no known security issues; its use here is appropriate and consistent across versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): aws-cdk-team is a highly trusted publisher with 4586 approved packages; lack of Sigstore provenance is not a meaningful risk signal for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 351)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.0.7 | 13 / 28 | |
| 6.0.6 | 13 / 28 | |
| 6.0.5 | 13 / 28 | |
| 6.0.4 | 13 / 28 | |
| 6.0.3 | 13 / 28 | |
| 6.0.2 | 13 / 28 | |
| 6.0.1 | 13 / 28 | |
| 6.0.0 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.58 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.57 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.56 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.55 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.54 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.53 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.49 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.48 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.47 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.46 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.45 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.44 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.43 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.42 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.39 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.38 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.37 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.36 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.35 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.34 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.33 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.32 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.31 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.30 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.29 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.28 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.27 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.26 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.25 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.24 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.23 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.22 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.21 | 13 / 28 | |
| 5.9.20 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.19 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.15 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.14 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.13 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.12 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.11 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.10 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.9 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.8 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.7 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.6 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.5 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.4 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.3 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.2 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.1 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.9.0 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.25 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.24 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.23 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.22 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.19 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.18 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.17 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.16 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.15 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.14 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.13 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.12 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.11 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.10 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.9 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.8 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.7 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.6 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.5 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.4 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.3 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.2 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.1 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.8.0 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.23 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.22 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.21 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.20 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.19 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.18 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.17 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.16 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.15 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.14 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.13 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.12 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.11 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.10 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.9 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.8 | 13 / 29 | |
| 5.7.7 | 13 / 29 |
v6.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.9.58
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.9.57
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.9.56
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.9.55
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.9.54
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.8.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.8.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.8.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.8.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.8.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.7.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.7.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.7.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.7.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.7.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.7.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.7.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.