kysely-codegen
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:git-diff | AI (dependencies): git-diff is a legitimate utility dep for a codegen tool that diffs generated output; stable use across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.20.0 | 9 / 45 | |
| 0.19.0 | 9 / 45 | |
| 0.18.5 | 9 / 31 | |
| 0.18.4 | 9 / 30 |
v0.20.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.19.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.18.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.18.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.