locize
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established locize ecosystem package with long history; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:i18next-subliminal | AI (dependencies): i18next-subliminal is a locize ecosystem package appropriate for this in-context editor; same maintainer context. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.0 | 3 / 20 | |
| 4.0.24 | 3 / 20 | |
| 4.0.23 | 3 / 20 | |
| 4.0.22 | 3 / 20 | |
| 4.0.21 | 3 / 20 |
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.