mcp-proxy
A TypeScript SSE proxy for MCP servers that use stdio transport.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/stdio-DN-u_q7a.mjs | AI (source-diff): Rolldown bundle for an SSE proxy; network + require patterns are expected library code, not malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/stdio-DQCs94rj.js | AI (source-diff): File is a rolldown-bundled output of the package's TypeScript source. Network usage is expected for an SSE proxy; dynamic patterns are standard CommonJS interop shims generated by the bundler, not malware. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): process.env spread occurs only in test files (proxyServer.test.ts) to pass env vars to child processes — standard test scaffolding, not production code. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): Raw IP 127.0.0.1 appears only in test files for localhost test server setup — normal and expected for integration tests. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.5.1 | 1 / 23 | |
| 6.5.0 | 1 / 23 | |
| 6.4.6 | 1 / 23 | |
| 6.4.5 | 1 / 23 | |
| 5.11.2 | 0 / 23 | |
| 5.11.0 | 0 / 23 | |
| 5.10.0 | 0 / 23 |
v6.5.1
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.6
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/punkpeye/mcp-proxy/blob/efa9a891de66f609ff0e0f27f739994ac7362f1d/src/proxyServer.test.ts#L44 42 | command: "tsx", 43 | env: serverDelay > 44 | ? ({ ...process.env, RESPONSE_DELAY: serverDelay } as Record< 45 | string, 46 | string
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.11.2
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.