micro-eth-signer
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:micro-rlp | AI (dependencies): Author's own sibling library, standard dep for this early version. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:advanced/clearsig-repo-full.js | AI (source-diff): Auto-generated ERC-7730 registry JSON data, not obfuscation; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:advanced/clearsig-repo.js | AI (source-diff): Auto-generated ERC-7730 registry JSON data, not obfuscation; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:src/advanced/clearsig-repo-full.ts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript source of auto-generated registry data; stable pattern. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-tlds | AI (semgrep): DeFi protocol URLs in registry data, not C2 endpoints; stable for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:advanced/abi.js | AI (source-diff): Hex-encoded Ethereum tx in JSDoc example, not a hidden payload. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:src/advanced/clearsig-repo.ts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript source of auto-generated registry data; stable pattern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:micro-packed | AI (dependencies): micro-packed is a legitimate dependency by the same author (Paul Miller); used for binary encoding in Ethereum transaction handling. Stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 34 of 34)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.19.0 | 4 / 8 | |
| 0.18.1 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.17.3 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.17.2 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.17.1 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.17.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.16.0 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.15.0 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.14.0 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.13.3 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.13.1 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.13.0 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.12.2 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.12.1 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.12.0 | 3 / 9 | |
| 0.11.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.10.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.9.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.9.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.6.5 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.6.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.6.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.6.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.6.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.6.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.5.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.4.8 | 3 / 7 | |
| 0.4.7 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.4.2 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.2.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.1.6 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.1.2 | 3 / 6 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 6 |
v0.14.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.1
1 findingThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
v0.13.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.