miniprogram-simulate
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:steganography-image-eval | AI (semgrep): Reads .js files from filesystem to simulate require() in miniprogram test env; not image steganography. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): Executes compiler-generated WXML-to-JS output; inherent to miniprogram simulator design. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require is the core mechanism for simulating miniprogram module loading in tests. | ai |
Versions (showing 1 of 1)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.6.1 | 6 / 18 |
v1.6.1
2 findingsData read from image file then executed — steganography attack pattern Source: https://github.com/wechat-miniprogram/miniprogram-simulate/blob/e73b60e412897d4b5551f6f05b72baa3c1cc5acd/src/utils.js#L50 48 | } 49 | window.require = runJs = filePath => { > 50 | const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath + '.js') 51 | if (content) { 52 | // eslint-disable-next-line no-new-func
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.