modal
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:protobufjs | AI (dependencies): protobufjs is a well-known, widely-used protobuf library; its use is expected and appropriate for a gRPC-based SDK like Modal. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:long | AI (phantom-deps): long is a transitive dependency of protobufjs used in gRPC/protobuf setups; declared for version pinning, not direct import. Stable pattern for this SDK. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:protobufjs | AI (phantom-deps): protobufjs is used in the gRPC/proto build pipeline (gen-proto.sh); declared for compatibility pinning. Stable pattern for this SDK. | ai |
Versions (showing 26 of 26)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.7.4 | 6 / 18 | |
| 0.7.2 | 6 / 18 | |
| 0.7.1 | 6 / 18 | |
| 0.7.0 | 6 / 17 | |
| 0.6.3 | 6 / 17 | |
| 0.6.2 | 6 / 17 | |
| 0.6.1 | 6 / 17 | |
| 0.6.0 | 6 / 17 | |
| 0.5.6 | 6 / 17 | |
| 0.5.5 | 6 / 17 | |
| 0.5.4 | 6 / 17 | |
| 0.5.3 | 6 / 17 | |
| 0.5.2 | 6 / 17 | |
| 0.3.13 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.3.12 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.3.11 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.3.10 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.3.8 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.3.7 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.3.6 | 5 / 15 | |
| 0.3.5 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.3.4 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.3.3 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.3.2 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.3.1 | 5 / 9 | |
| 0.3.0 | 5 / 9 |
v0.7.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.