newrelic
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): New Relic agent; gitHead presence varies by publish environment, not a security signal. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy is on v12 line; v13 was active. Backport/patch releases are normal. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Migrated to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; standard for this org. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): OTel trace attribute deserialization in lib/otel/traces/utils.js; input comes from agent config, not external untrusted sources. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:eval-usage | AI (semgrep): stub_api.js uses eval solely to create named stub functions; input is a hardcoded string template, not user data. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@newrelic/koa | AI (phantom-deps): Instrumentation dep loaded dynamically at runtime when koa is present; phantom-dep is a false positive here. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-bulk-read | AI (semgrep): APM agent reads only NEW_RELIC_METADATA_* prefixed env vars for metadata collection — expected behavior. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@newrelic/superagent | AI (phantom-deps): Same dynamic instrumentation loading pattern; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@grpc/grpc-js | AI (phantom-deps): Used for gRPC infinite tracing; loaded conditionally at runtime. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@newrelic/aws-sdk | AI (phantom-deps): Same dynamic instrumentation loading pattern; stable false positive. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Decodes distributed trace payloads; standard APM instrumentation pattern. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:child-process-import | AI (semgrep): Used in system-info.js to collect host/utilization data; expected for APM agent. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): In CLI bin/test-naming-rules.js to load user-supplied rules file; not in runtime agent path. | ai |
Versions (showing 40 of 40)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 14.1.0 | 24 / 34 | |
| 14.0.0 | 22 / 38 | |
| 13.20.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.19.2 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.19.1 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.19.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.18.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.17.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.16.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.15.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.14.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.13.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.12.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.11.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.10.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.9.2 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.9.1 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.9.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.8.1 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.8.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.7.0 | 23 / 38 | |
| 13.6.6 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.6.5 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.6.4 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.6.3 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.6.2 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.6.1 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.6.0 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.5.0 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.4.0 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.3.3 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.3.2 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.3.1 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.3.0 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.2.1 | 23 / 42 | |
| 13.2.0 | 23 / 43 | |
| 13.1.0 | 22 / 42 | |
| 13.0.0 | 20 / 42 | |
| 12.25.1 | 20 / 42 | |
| 10.6.1 | 17 / 43 |
v14.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v14.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.20.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.19.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.19.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.19.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.18.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.17.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.16.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.15.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.14.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.13.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.12.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.11.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.10.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.9.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.9.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.9.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.8.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.7.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.6.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.6.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.6.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.6.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.6.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.6.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.6.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v13.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v13.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v12.25.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: newrelic.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.