node-appwrite
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:node-fetch-native-with-agent | AI (dependencies): Standard HTTP fetch utility used by the Appwrite SDK; no malware indicators, stable across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 27.0.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 26.2.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 26.1.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 26.0.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 25.2.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 25.1.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 25.0.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 24.1.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 24.0.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 23.1.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 23.0.0 | 2 / 7 | |
| 22.1.3 | 2 / 6 | |
| 22.1.2 | 2 / 6 | |
| 22.1.1 | 2 / 6 | |
| 22.1.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 22.0.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 21.1.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 21.0.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 20.3.0 | 1 / 5 |
v27.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v23.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v22.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v22.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v22.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v22.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (stnguyen90) on 2026-02-16, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v22.0.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (stnguyen90) on 2026-02-02, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v21.1.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (stnguyen90) than the most recent previously approved version (torstendittmann) on 2025-12-24, but stnguyen90 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v21.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v20.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.