node-opcua-service-subscription
pure nodejs OPCUA SDK - module service-subscription
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from erossignon to GitHub Actions is a documented CI/CD migration for the node-opcua monorepo, backed by SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy reflects the monorepo CI migration, not account takeover; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate publish pipeline. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:node-opcua-types | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same node-opcua monorepo; version-locked to matching release. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:node-opcua-variant | AI (dependencies): Sibling package from the same node-opcua monorepo; version-locked to matching release. | ai |
Versions (showing 22 of 22)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.173.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.172.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.170.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.169.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.168.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.167.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.166.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.165.2 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.165.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.165.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.164.2 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.163.1 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.163.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.162.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.161.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.160.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.159.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.158.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.157.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.155.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.154.0 | 3 / 7 | |
| 2.153.0 | 3 / 7 |
v2.173.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.172.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.170.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.169.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.166.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.165.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.165.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.165.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.164.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.163.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.163.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.162.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.161.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.160.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.159.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.158.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.157.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.155.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.154.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.153.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.