node-opcua-variant
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Legitimate CI/CD migration to GitHub Actions; SLSA attestation confirms provenance. Stable for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy reflects CI/CD transition, not account takeover; SLSA attestation and 49 approved dependents confirm legitimacy. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.173.0 | 9 / 5 | |
| 2.172.0 | 9 / 5 | |
| 2.170.0 | 9 / 5 | |
| 2.169.0 | 9 / 5 | |
| 2.168.0 | 9 / 5 | |
| 2.167.0 | 9 / 9 | |
| 2.165.0 | 9 / 9 | |
| 2.164.0 | 9 / 9 | |
| 2.163.0 | 9 / 9 | |
| 2.162.0 | 9 / 9 | |
| 2.161.0 | 9 / 9 | |
| 2.159.0 | 9 / 9 | |
| 2.158.0 | 9 / 9 | |
| 2.157.0 | 9 / 9 | |
| 2.155.0 | 8 / 9 | |
| 2.154.0 | 8 / 9 | |
| 2.153.0 | 8 / 9 |
v2.173.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.172.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.170.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.169.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.165.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.164.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.163.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.162.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.161.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.159.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.158.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.157.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.155.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.154.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.153.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.