officeparser
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/officeparser.browser.iife.js | AI (source-diff): Standard esbuild minified browser bundle with base64 polyfill; stable false positive. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/officeparser.browser.mjs | AI (source-diff): Standard esbuild minified browser bundle with base64 polyfill; stable false positive. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed from personal account to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance — this is a security improvement, not a takeover. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/[email protected] | AI (source-diff): Browser bundle produced by esbuild; standard minified output bundling pdfjs-dist, tesseract.js, and Node polyfills. Expected for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/[email protected] | AI (source-diff): Browser bundle includes pdfjs-dist and tesseract.js which legitimately use network calls and dynamic patterns. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/officeparser.browser.js | AI (source-diff): Browser bundle produced by esbuild; long strings are minified JS utility code, not obfuscated payloads. Stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.0.0 | 5 / 13 | |
| 6.1.1 | 5 / 9 | |
| 6.1.0 | 5 / 9 | |
| 6.0.7 | 6 / 10 | |
| 6.0.6 | 6 / 9 | |
| 6.0.4 | 6 / 9 | |
| 6.0.3 | 6 / 9 | |
| 6.0.2 | 6 / 9 | |
| 6.0.1 | 6 / 9 | |
| 5.2.2 | 6 / 5 |
v7.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.1
3 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.7
5 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.0.6
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.4
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.3
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.