opentui-spinner
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src-DjeqLSfu.mjs | AI (source-diff): Content-hash named chunk from tsdown bundler; code is readable spinner scheduler logic, not obfuscated malware. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.7 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.0.6 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.5 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.4 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.3 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.0.2 | 1 / 3 |
v0.0.7
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.