phoenix
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file-transition:priv/static/phoenix.js | AI (source-diff): phoenix.js is webpack-minified dist bundle, not obfuscation; stable build artifact. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file-transition:priv/static/phoenix.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled client lib; net+eval patterns are webpack runtime, no hostile destination. | ai | |
| provenance | regressed-provenance | AI (provenance): Manual publish by known maintainer on official Phoenix package; benign, no malicious behavior in diff. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Moved to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing with SLSA provenance; legitimate transition for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | rapid-publish | AI (publish-pattern): CI/CD automated publishing commonly produces rapid successive publishes. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.8.9 | 0 / 12 | |
| 1.8.8 | 0 / 12 | |
| 1.8.7 | 0 / 12 | |
| 1.8.6 | 0 / 12 | |
| 1.8.5 | 0 / 12 | |
| 1.7.24 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.23 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.22 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.21 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.20 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.19 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.18 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.17 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.16 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.15 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.7.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.6.17 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.5.15 | 0 / 0 |
v1.8.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.24
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (steffend) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-07, but steffend is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.7.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.6.17
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (steffend) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-07, but steffend is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.5.15
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. The axios attack (March 2026) exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (steffend) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-07, but steffend is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.