postcode-validator
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.10.15 | 0 / 19 | |
| 3.10.14 | 0 / 19 | |
| 3.10.13 | 0 / 15 | |
| 3.10.12 | 0 / 15 | |
| 3.10.11 | 0 / 15 | |
| 3.10.9 | 0 / 15 | |
| 3.10.5 | 0 / 14 | |
| 3.10.4 | 0 / 14 |
v3.10.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.10.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.10.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.10.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.10.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.10.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.10.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.