preact-custom-element
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): rschristian is a known preactjs org maintainer with strong track record; transition is credible. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): rschristian is an established preactjs org contributor; transition is consistent with org-level maintainer management. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.6.0 | 0 / 12 | |
| 4.5.1 | 0 / 11 | |
| 4.5.0 | 0 / 11 | |
| 4.4.0 | 0 / 13 |
v4.5.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.