radix-ui
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New deps are all first-party @radix-ui/* modules. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Build-env metadata change; no behavioral risk for this canonical package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Mature UI library with periodic release cadence; dormancy is normal for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA provenance; stable for this package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Umbrella re-export package; missing description is cosmetic, not suspicious. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radix-ui/react-select | AI (dependencies): Official @radix-ui sub-package from the canonical Radix UI primitives monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radix-ui/react-tooltip | AI (dependencies): Official @radix-ui sub-package from the canonical Radix UI primitives monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radix-ui/react-dropdown-menu | AI (dependencies): Official @radix-ui sub-package from the canonical Radix UI primitives monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radix-ui/react-hover-card | AI (dependencies): Official @radix-ui sub-package from the canonical Radix UI primitives monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radix-ui/react-menu | AI (dependencies): Official @radix-ui sub-package from the canonical Radix UI primitives monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radix-ui/react-avatar | AI (dependencies): Official @radix-ui sub-package from the canonical Radix UI primitives monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radix-ui/react-dialog | AI (dependencies): Official @radix-ui sub-package from the canonical Radix UI primitives monorepo. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@radix-ui/react-popper | AI (dependencies): Official @radix-ui sub-package from the canonical Radix UI primitives monorepo. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established official Radix UI package; lack of Sigstore provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.6.7 | 55 / 7 | |
| 1.6.6 | 55 / 7 | |
| 1.6.5 | 55 / 7 | |
| 1.6.4 | 55 / 7 | |
| 1.6.3 | 55 / 7 | |
| 1.6.2 | 55 / 7 | |
| 1.6.1 | 55 / 7 | |
| 1.6.0 | 55 / 7 | |
| 1.5.0 | 55 / 7 | |
| 1.4.3 | 55 / 9 | |
| 1.4.2 | 55 / 9 | |
| 1.4.1 | 55 / 9 | |
| 1.4.0 | 55 / 9 | |
| 1.3.4 | 54 / 9 | |
| 1.3.3 | 54 / 9 | |
| 1.3.2 | 54 / 9 | |
| 1.3.1 | 54 / 9 | |
| 1.3.0 | 54 / 9 | |
| 1.2.0 | 50 / 8 | |
| 1.1.3 | 50 / 8 | |
| 1.1.2 | 50 / 6 | |
| 1.1.1 | 49 / 6 | |
| 1.1.0 | 49 / 6 | |
| 1.0.1 | 31 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 31 / 0 |
v1.6.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.5
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (chancestrickland) on 2026-07-22, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.6.4
2 findingsThis version was published without provenance, but prior versions were published via CI/CD with attestations. This is a strong signal of a potential account compromise or unauthorized publish. Multiple high-profile registry compromises have exhibited exactly this pattern.
This version was published by a different npm account (chancestrickland) than the most recent previously approved version (GitHub Actions) on 2026-07-20, but chancestrickland is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.6.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.4
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: chancestrickland.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.