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ramda-adjunct

npm Repository Homepage
2
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

char0n

Keywords

ramdautilsutilitiestoolkitextensionsaddonsadjunctrecipesextrascookbookfunctional

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
npm-metadata url-dep:docdash AI (npm-metadata): devDependency pointing to maintainer's own fork, SHA-pinned; not shipped to consumers. Stable for this package. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): No provenance is common; not a blocking signal for an established package. ai

Versions (showing 2 of 2)

Version Deps Published
6.1.0 0 / 52
6.0.0 0 / 52

v6.1.0

2 findings
HIGH SHA-pinned github dependency (devDependencies): docdash npm-metadata

Dependency 'docdash' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/char0n/docdash.git#534b44382138a55dd8d93642c979e51e46471185' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v6.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.